This paper focuses on zero-sum stochastic differential games in the framework of forward-backward stochastic differential equations on a finite time horizon with both players adopting impulse controls. By means of BSDE methods, in particular that of the notion from Peng's stochastic backward semigroups, we prove a dynamic programming principle for both the upper and the lower value functions of the game. The upper and the lower value functions are then shown to be the unique viscosity solutions of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equations with a double-obstacle. As a consequence, the uniqueness implies that the upper and lower value functions coincide and the game admits a value.
Introduction
Fleming and Souganidis ( [23] , 1989) first investigated two-player zero-sum stochastic differential games as a pioneering work in a rigorous manner and proved that the lower and the upper value functions of such games fulfil the dynamic programming principle shown to be the unique viscosity solutions of the associated HJBI equations and coincide under the Isaacs condition. This work developed the former results on differential games by Isaacs [29] , Elliott and Kalton [18] , Friedman [21] , Evans and Souganidis [19] from the purely deterministic into the stochastic framework and has made a huge progress in the field of stochastic differential games. Since then the paper [23] is considered as a fundamental work in this direction. Subsequently, employing their approach, there are large literature extends it into new contexts, For instance, Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Rainer [6] prove the existence of Nash equilibrium points for stochastic nonzero-sum differential games and to characterize them. Meanwhile, the theory of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDE for short) has been successfully used to the study of stochastic differential games; In this direction, reader can see Hamadène and Lepeltier [25] and Hamadène, Lepeltier, and Peng [26] . In particular, Buckdahn and Li [9] developed the findings obtained in [25, 26] and generalized the framework in [23] to BSDE. Another direction for generalization can be seen in Bayraktar and Poor [7] and Browne [8] . Concerning optimal stopping games the interested reader is referred to the work of Ekstrm and Peskir [20] , of Karatzas and Sudderth [30] , as well as of Karatzas and Zamfirescu [34] (for more information see reference therein).
Different from continuous control, impulse control is also an interesting topic in stochastic control theory. There are three approaches to exploit it. From functional analysis methods, see Bensoussan and Lions [3] . From direct probabilistic methods, see Robin [44] and Stettner [45] . Through viscosity solution approach concerning the study of impulse control, reader can see, for example, Lenhart [36] , Tang and Yong [48] , and Kharroubi et al. [32] . Impulse control has been found as a useful tool for realistic models in mathematical finance. For instance, transaction costs and liquidity risk in financial markets. For more information on this field refer, in particular, Korn [33] , Ly Vath, Mnif and Pham [37] and Bruder and Pham [10] , Tang and Hou [47] .
Cosso [14] and El Asri and Mazid [1] studied a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game, with both players adopting impulse controls on a finite time horizon of the following type: The state process is governed by a n-dimensional SDE of the following type: 
for all s ∈ [t, T ] , P -a.s., with X t− = x, on some filtered probability space (Ω, F, P ), where b : [0, T ] × R n → R n , σ (·, ·) : [0, T ] × R n → R n×d are given deterministic functions, (W s ) s≥0 is an d-dimensional Brownian motion, (x, t) are initial time and state. The infinite product Π l≥1 1 {τm =ρ l } has the certain meaning: Whenever the two players act together on the system at the same time, we take into account only the action of player II. The gain functional for player I (resp., cost functional for player II) of the stochastic differential game is given by J (t, x; u, v) = E 
where f : [0, T ]×R n → R and g : R n → R are two given deterministic functions, f denoting the running function and g the payoff. The function c is the cost function for player I and is a gain function for player II, representing that when player I performs an action he/she has to pay a cost, resulting in a gain for player II. Analogously, χ is the cost function for player II and is a gain function for player I. Cosso [14] and El Asri and Mazid [1] (under weak assumptions) has shown that the upper and lower value functions coincide and the game admits a value. The theory of BSDE can be traced back to Bismut [2] who studied linear BSDE motivated by stochastic control problems. Pardoux and Peng 1990 [39] proved the wellposedness for nonlinear BSDE. Subsequently, Duffie and Epstein (1992) introduced the notion of recursive utilities in continuous time, which is actually a type of BSDE where the generator f is independent of z. Then, El Karoui et al. (1997 Karoui et al. ( , 2001 ) extended the recursive utility to the case where f contains z. The term z can be interpreted as an ambiguity aversion term in the market (see Chen and Epstein 2002 [15] ). Particularly, the celebrated Black-Scholes formula indeed provided an effective way of representing the option price (which is the solution to a kind of linear BSDE) through the solution to the Black-Scholes equation (parabolic partial differential equation actually). Since then, BSDE has been extensively studied and used in the areas of applied probability and optimal stochastic controls, particularly in financial engineering (see [35] ).
In our present work, application of BSDE methods, in particular, the notion of stochastic backward semigroups (Peng [42] ) allows us to prove the dynamic programming principle for the upper and lower value functions of the game, with both players adopting impulse controls on a finite time horizon, and to derive from it with the help of Peng's method (see [42, 41] ) the associated HJBI equations with a double-obstacle. To the best knowledge of ours, this is the first time to study games problem via BSDE adopting impulse controls. Besides, it is well known that the Hamiltonian system obtained by the Pontryagin's maximum principle to study the stochastic optimal control problems is one kind of FBSDEs. Therefore, the research on FBSDEs is of great significance.
Specifically, consider
More details around FBSDEs (3) will be put in the next section. In the present paper, we are interested in studying two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game, with both players adopting impulse controls on a finite time horizon driven by FBSDEs (3). Compared with above literature, our paper has several new features. The novelty of the formulation and the contribution in this paper may be stated as follows: On the one hand, in the framework of BSDE, the terminal condition will turn out to be a traditional Φ(X t,x;u,v T ) plus gains functions with impulses controls. This new trait makes the backward semigroup senses and avoids the Itô's formula with jumps; On the other hand, in Cosso [14] and El Asri and Mazid [1] , the cost functional is defined by (2) via absolute expectation, essential a linear expectation. Nevertheless, in contrast to them, our paper considers a more general running cost functional, which implies that the cost functionals will be supported by a BSDE, which in fact defines a nonlinear expectation. Thanks to comparison theorems of BSDE, we need them as an analytical tool. Finally, we point out that the paper (Cosso [14] , 2013) was concluded in the end with "we could apply backward stochastic differential equations methods to provide a probabilistic representation, known as the nonlinear Feynman-Kac formula, for the value function of the game" . So our paper can be regarded as a response to it. The results reported in the present paper aimed to further perfect this theory in the framework of BSDE, with more rigorous proofs and new techniques introduced.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: After some preliminaries and notations in the second section, we are devoted the third section to studying the regularity properties of the upper and lower value functions, for instance, they are deterministic, continuous on [0, T ) × R n and bounded. Moreover, we prove the dynamic programming principle for the stochastic differential game with some corollaries and generalizations, which are useful in proving that the two value functions are viscosity solutions to the HJBI equation in Section 4. Furthermore, under certain assumptions, we establish the comparison theorem for the HJBI equation, from which one may deduce that the game admits a value. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude the novelty of this paper and schedule possible generalizations in future.
Preliminaries and Notations
Throughout this paper, we denote by R n the space of n-dimensional Euclidean space, by R n×d the space the matrices with order n × d. The probability space is the classical Wiener space (Ω, F, P ), and the Brownian motion W will be the coordinate process on Ω. Precisely: Ω is the set of continuous functions from
F is the Borel σ-algebra over Ω, completed with respect to the Wiener measure P on this space, and W denotes the coordinate process:
we denote the natural filtration generated by {W s } 0≤s≤T and augmented by all P-null sets, i.e., F s = σ {W r , r ≤ s} ∨ N P , s ∈ [t, T ] , where N P is the set of all P -null subsets and T > 0 a fixed real time horizon. For each t > 0, we denote by F t s , t ≤ s ≤ T the natural filtration of the Brownian motion {W s − W t , t ≤ s ≤ T }, augmented by N P . ⊤ appearing in this paper as superscript denotes the transpose of a matrix. U and V are two convex cones of R n with U ⊂ V . In what follows, C represents a generic constant, which can be different from line to line. Now, we give the following definition.
, the action time, is a nondecreasing sequence of F-stopping time, valued in [t, T ] ∪ {+∞} .
(2) (ξ m ) m (resp., (η l ) l ), the actions, is a sequence of U -valued (resp., V -valued) random variable, where each ξ m (resp., η l ) is F τm -measurable (resp., F ρ l -measurable).
Remark 2. Let D ([0, T ] ; R m ) be the space of all functions ξ : [0, T ] → R m that are right limit with left continuous. Then, the pure jump part of ξ is defined by ξ j (t) = 0≤s≤t ∆ξ (s) , and the continuous part is ξ c (t) = ξ (t) − ξ j (t) . by Lebesgue decomposition Theorem that we have ξ c (t) = ξ ac (t)+ξ sc (t), t ∈ [0, T ], where ξ ac (t) is called the absolutely continuous part of ξ, and ξ sc the singularly continuous part of ξ. Thus, we obtain that
, then the singular control performs a special form of a pure jump process, so-called impulse control (see [50] for details).
We now introduce the following spaces of processes:
We assume that the following conditions hold. To define a well-defined gain functional, we add the following assumption and introduce the concept of admissible impulse controls. Meanwhile, to ensure that multiple impulses occurring at the same time are suboptimal, we put
Hölder continuous in time, uniformly with respect to the other variable. Furthermore,
and there exists a function h :
and
for y 1 , z, y 2 ∈ U and z 1 , z 2 ∈ V. Moreover, c (t, y) ≥ c ť , y and χ (t, y) ≥ χ ť , y
for all t,ť ∈ [0, T ] satisfying t ≤ť, y ∈ U and z ∈ V.
Definition 3. Let u = m≥1 ξ m 1 [τm,T ] be an impulse control on [t, T ], and let σ, τ be two [t, T ]-valued F-stopping times. Then we define the restriction u [τ,σ] of the impulse control u by
where µ t,τ (u) is called the number of impulses up to time τ, namely, µ t,τ (u) := m≥1 1 {τm≤τ } .
We now introduce the following subspaces of admissible controls.
Definition 4. An admissible impulse control u for player I (resp., v for player II) on [t, T ] is an impulse control for player I (resp., II) on [t, T ] with a finite average number of impulses, i.e.,
is given by (8) . The set of all admissible impulse controls for player I (resp., II) on [t, T ] is denoted by U t,T (resp., V t,T ). We identify two impulse controls
Finally, we have still to define the admissible strategies for the game. 
Nonanticipative strategies for player II on [t, T ], denoted by β : U t,T → V t,T , are defined similarly. The set of all nonanticipative strategies α (resp., β) for player I (resp., II) on [t, T ] is denoted by A t,T (resp., B t,T ).
Assume that (A1)-(A3) are in force, for any u (·) × v (·) ∈ U 1 × U 2 , it is easy to check that FBSDEs (3) admit a unique F t -adapted strong solution denoted by the triple
(See Pardoux and Peng [39] ). Like Peng in [42] , given any impulse controls u (·) × v (·) ∈ U t,T × V t,T , we introduce the following cost functional:
Under assumptions (A1)-(A3), the gain functional J(t, x; u (·) , v (·)), defined by (9) is well defined for every (t, x) ∈ [t, T ] × R n , u ∈ U t,T , and v (·) ∈ V t,T . We are interested in two value functions of the stochastic differential games of the following type:
Lemma 7 (Comparison theorem). Let y i , z i , i = 1, 2, be the solution to the following
where E ξ i 2 < ∞, f i s, y i , z i satisfies the conditions (A2), i = 1, 2. Under assumption (A2), BSDE (13) admits a unique adapted solution y i , z i , respectively, for i = 1, 2.
Dynamic Principle Programming
In this section, we present the DPP for our stochastic differential games in the framework of BSDE. At the beginning, we state the follow lemma which tells us that the values function as usual are deterministic function on time and state variable in the sense of coinciding with deterministic version itself, which is important to investigate the other properties of value functions.
function. An analogous statement holds for the value function V + .
Proof. We adopt the idea from [9] . For convenience of reader, we display the main idea here. Let H denote the Cameron-Martin space of all absolutely continuous elements h ∈ Ω whose derivativeḣ belongs to
Clearly, τ h : Ω → Ω is a bijection, and its law is
arbitrarily fixed, and put
, P -a.s. Next, substitute the transformed control processes u (τ h ) and v (τ h ) for u and v into FBSDEs (3) and take the Girsanov transformation to (3), finally compare the obtained equation with the previous ones. Then from the uniqueness of the solution of (3), we conclude with X t,x;u,v s
Then β h ∈ B t,T , which makes U t,T into V t,T . Moreover, it is easy to check that this mapping is nonanticipating and verify
which holds even for all h ∈ H. Recall the definition of the filtration, the F t -measurable random variable V − (t, x) (ω), ω ∈ Ω, depends only on the restriction of ω to the time interval [0, t]. We complete our proof with help of Lemma 3.4 in [9] . We shall consider the value functions obtained by no impulse controls, which is useful to prove the Hölder continuity of value functions in the sequel.
Lemma 9. Suppose that assumptions (A1)-(A3) hold true, then the lower and upper value functions are given by
whereŪ t,T andV t,T contain all the impulse controls in U t,T and V t,T , respectively, which have no impulses at time t. Similarly,Ā t,T andB t,T are subsets of A t,T and B t,T , respectively. In particular, they contain all the nonanticipative strategies with values inŪ t,T and V t,T , respectively.
Proof. Fix ǫ > 0. Let u ∈ U t,T \Ū t,T and β ∈ B t,T \B t,T . Then, let v := β (u) ∈ V t,T and β (ǔ) =v ∈V t,T for anyǔ ∈ U t,T for someβ ∈B t,T . Hence, we have to prove that there existū ∈Ū t,T andv ∈V t,T such that
We may suppose v := V t,T \V t,T ; in the other case can be proved similarly. At the beginning, let u and v have only a single impulse at time t. Therefore, there exist two [t, T ]-valued F-stopping times τ and ρ, with P (τ = t) > 0 and
, ξ is an F τ -measurable U -valued random variable and η is an F ρ -measurable V -valued random variable. Let us introduce the following stopping times:
Clearly, τ n → τ and ρ n → ρ, as n approaches to infinity, P -a.s. Now we define the admissible impulse controls as follows:
By Lemma 6 and Lemma 8, we have the following estimate:
Note that, for every s
as n → ∞, P -a.s. Therefore, from Grönwall's inequality and the dominated convergence theorem, there exists
As for multiple impulses at time t, one can show the same result by using the assumptions (A3), which actually leads to the case of the previous one with only a single impulse at time t. We thus complete the proof. Now we prove the two values functions are bounded.
Proposition 10. Assume that assumptions (A1)-(A3) are in force, the lower and upper value functions are bounded.
Proof. We only consider the lower value function; the other case is analogous. Let ε > 0; then, by the definition of lower value function (10), we have, for any (t,
, where u 0 ∈ U t,T denotes the control with no impulses,
The last inequality above is based on the condition (4) and the comparison theorem (Lemma 7). Due to f and Φ are bounded, we deduce that V − is bounded from below. In a similar way, we can prove that V − is also bounded from above. The proof is completed.
After getting the first result on value functions, we now focus on (the generalized) DPP in the framework our stochastic differential game (3), (10) and (11) . To this end, we should first define the family of (backward) semigroups associated with FBSDEs (3). As a matter of fact, this concept of stochastic backward semigroups was first introduced by Peng [42] which was employed to investigate the DPP for stochastic control problems. We also borrow this idea to deal with our stochastic differential games, but with slightly different expression.
For every the initial data (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R n , a positive number δ ≤ T − t, two admissible impulse control processes u ∈ U t,T and v ∈ V t,T , and a real-valued random variable η ∈ L 2 (Ω, F t+δ , P ; R)), we define
is the solution of the following BSDE with the time horizon t + η:
for s ∈ [t, t + δ] and X t,x;u,v is the solution to SDE (3.1). Then, obviously, for the solution Y t,x;u,v , Z t,x;u,v to BSDE (3.5), we have
Indeed, 
Remark 12. We prove the dynamic programming principle only for V − ; the other case is analogous.
We proceed the proof that V − δ (t, x) coincides with V − (t, x) into the following steps. In the first step, we shall prove V − δ (t, x) ≥ V − (t, x) . To this end, we have
where the notation I δ (t, x, β) = sup u∈U t,t+δ I δ (t, x, u, β (u)) with
t+δ , P -a.s. and for some sequences
According the existence and uniquenss of FBSDEs (3), it follows that
We now focus on the time interval
, we also deduce that, with help of previous idea and Lemma 9, for any y ∈ R n , there exists β ε y ∈B t+δ,T for each u 2 ∈ U t+δ,T such that
Now consider a decomposition of R n , namely,
Clearly, we always have
For every y i ∈ O i , one can seek β ε y i ∈B t+δ,T such that (18) holds true. We introduce the strategy β 2,ε u 1 ∈B t+δ,T as follows:
Set β ε
and ρ
It is possible to define a new strategy β ε (u) from β ε,1 u 1 ∈ B t,t+δ and β Let
where µ t,t+δ is defined in (8) .
Next we shall show that β ε (u) is nonanticipating: Indeed, let κ : Ω → [t, T ] be an F-stopping time and u, u ′ ∈ U t,T be such that
is defined as follows:
then
, where
Thus
On the other hand, u 2 = u ′ 2 on (t + δ, κ ∨ t + δ] and on {κ > t + δ}, we have X
t+δ . This yields our desired result.
Fix u ∈ U t,T arbitrarily and decompose into u 1 = u [t,t+δ] , u 2 = u (t+δ,T ] . Then, from (17), and Lemmas 6 and 7, we obtain
From (28) and Lemma 6 and 7, it follows
− Cε, P -a.s., for every u ∈ U t,T .
Therefore, we obtain
We now deal with the other case:
. Let β ∈ B t,T be arbitrarily chosen and u 2 ∈Ū t+δ,T . Define the restriction of β to U t,t+δ as β 1 (u 1 ) := β (u 1 ⊕ u 2 ) [t,t+δ] , u 1 ∈ U t,t+δ . The nonanticipativity property of β indicates that β 1 is independent of the special choice of u 2 ∈Ū t+δ,T . From the definition of V
then there exists a sequence u 1 i i≥1
⊂Ū t,t+δ such that
With the same technique as before, for any ε > 0, set
From the existence and uniqueness of FBSDEs (3), we deduce that
Noting that β 1 (·) := β (· ⊕ u 2 ) ∈ B t,t+δ does not depend on u 2 ∈Ū t+δ,T , we can construct
, for each u 2 ∈Ū t+δ,T such that β 2 :Ū t+δ,T →V t+δ,T belongs toB t+δ,T , due to β ∈ B t,T . Therefore, from the definition of V − (t + δ, y) and Lemma 9, we have, for any y ∈ R n ,
There exists a sequence u i 2 i≥1
Then with the same technique as before, for any ε > 0, set
. From the existence and uniqueness of FBSDEs (3), we have
where u ε = u ε 1 ⊕ u ε 2 ∈ U t,T . Repeating the method before, from (29) and (30) and Lemma 7, we have
which holds for all β ∈ B t,T .
Now letting ε → 0, we get the desired result, V − δ (t, x) ≤ V − (t, x). The proof is completed. 
Proof. The first property of the lower value function V − (t, x) which we present is an immediate consequence of Lemma 6. Let (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × R n and δ > 0 be arbitrarily given such that 0 < δ < T − t. Then for every ε > 0, thanks to Lemma 9, there exist u ε ∈ U t,T and β ε ∈B t,T (This ensures no impulse on initial state) such that
whereû ε ∈ U t+δ,T andβ ε ∈ B t,T will be determined soon. Indeed, from (14) and (15), there exist u ε ∈ U t,T and β ε ∈B t,T such that
and G t,x;ûε,βε(ûε) t+δ,T Φ X t,x;ûε,βε(ûε) T
From (34) and (35), one can obtain (33) easily. We postulate that
Observe thatû ε is an impulse control constructing from u ε via gathering all the impulses in the interval [t, t + δ] . To eliminate the impulses on time t + δ of player II, we define v ε =β ε (u) = β ε (û ε ) ∈V t+δ,T for any u ∈ U t,T . After this work, (33) can be written as
We deal with 
but from conditions (5) and (7), we have
Hence, (37) yields 
Taking the expectation on both sides of (38) 
Therefore,
Letting ε → 0, we get the desired result. We thus complete the proof. Now we are concerned on a special case of DPP, that is s = t, thanks to conditions (A3), the multiple impulses can be neglected. It will be useful in proving that the two value functions are viscosity solutions to the associated HJBI equation and deriving the so called lower and upper obstacles. At the same time, it tells that our games problems can interpreted via optimal stopping times.
where T t,+∞ is the set of F-stopping times with values in {t, +∞}, τ ∈ T t,+∞ , ξ ∈ F τ , u = ξ1 [τ,T ] and ρ ∈ T t,+∞ , η ∈ F ρ , β (u) = η1 [ρ,T ] . An analogous statement holds for the upper value function V + (t, x).
Proof. In Theorem 11, consider V − with δ = 0:
Given any u ∈ U t,T , consider the strategy
Apparently, τ ∈ T t,+∞ and ξ ∈ F τ . Meanwhile, we deduce that X t,x;u,β(u) t = X t,x;ξ1 [τ,T ] ,η1 [ρ,T ] t , P -a.s. By means of (A3), it follows that
As a result, we have
The reverse inequality can be proved in the analogous way. We end the proof. In order to prove the the two value functions satisfy, in the viscosity sense, the terminal condition to the HJBI equation. We need a useful technical lemma.
Lemma 15. Assume assumption (A1)-(A3) are in force, given any
where u 0 , v 0 are the controls with no impulses. An analogous statement holds for the upper value function V + .
Proof. For any ε > 0, from the definition of inf, there exist ρ ε,1 ∈ T t,+∞ , η ε,1 ∈ F ρ ε,1 such that the right side of(41)
To deal with
, letǔ ∈Ū t,T . From Theorem 11, there exsits a strategy β ε,2 ∈B t,T such that
It is easy to check that u ε ∈ U t,T and β ε ∈ B t,T . Hence, from (41), (42) and Theorem 11, we have
where associated with the Hamiltonians:
and the nonlocal operators H χ sup V and H c inf V are defined by
for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × R n , y ∈ R, p ∈ R n , Q ∈ S n where S n denotes the set of n × n symmetric matrices. The coefficients b, σ, f , Φ, χ and c are supposed to satisfy (A1)-(A3). When the two players act simultaneously on the system, we only consider the action of player I instead of player II. Then, repeating analogous arguments presented below, it can be proved that, with this assumption, the corresponding HJBI equation is given by
Therefore, the value of the game is not affected by the hypothesis regarding what player has the priority if we have that both value functions satisfy H c inf V (t, x) ≤ H χ sup V. Then, the two equations (43) and 45) coincide.
We next prove that the lower value function V − (t, x) introduced by (43) is the viscosity solution of (43) . We extend Cosso's work [14] for stochastic differential games involving impulse controls into Peng's BSDE's framework. The difficulties related with this extension come from the fact that now, contrarily to the framework of stochastic control theory studied by Peng, we have to do with stochastic differential games in which strategies are played versus controls. In order to overcome these difficulties in the proof that V − is a viscosity supersolution, we have, in particular, to enrich Peng's BSDE method. On the other hand, the proof that V − is a viscosity subsolution is not covered by Peng's BSDE method and requires a quite new approach. The uniqueness of the viscosity solution will be shown in the next section for the class of bounded continuous functions. We first recall the definition of a viscosity solution of (43) . The reader more interested in viscosity solutions is referred to Crandall, Ishii, and Lions [13] .
and for each x ∈ R n , we have
i.e., u is a subsolution to HJBI equation (43) .
, u is a supersolution to HJBI equation (43) .
is said to be a viscosity solution of (43) if it is both a viscosity sub and supersolution.
We have the other definition which will be useful to verify the viscosity solutions.
We denote by P 2,+ u (t, x), the "parabolic superjet" of u at (t, x) the set of triples (p, q, X) ∈ R × R n × S n which are such that
Similarly, we denote by P 2,− u (t, x) , the "parabolic subjet" of u at (t, x) the set of triples (p, q, X) ∈ R × R n × S n which are such that
and for each x ∈ R n , it holds
is a viscosity solution of (43) if it is both a viscosity sub and super solution. We now introduce the lower and upper obstacles with the help of the following lemms.
Lemma 20. Assume assumptions (A1)-(A3) are in force. Given any (t, x) ∈ (0, T ] × R n , we have
Proof. From Lemma 8, (40) can be expressed as
The following proof will be the same in [14] . We omit it.
as an upper obstacle. Both of them are implicit forms, since they depend on V − . The same remark applies to V + likewise.
We shall prove that the two value functions satisfy, in the viscosity sense, the terminal condition.
Lemma 22. Assume assumptions (A1)-(A3) are in force. The lower value function V − (T, x) is a viscosity solution of (43).
Proof. We shall prove
From Lemma 15, we have
Thanks to (A1)-(A2), it follows that
Repeating the method in Lemma 20, we have
According to (A3), namely the 1/2-Hölder continuity in time for c, χ and V − , we deduce that
for some C 1 > 0. Then, letting t = T in (54) ends the proof. We first prove that the lower value function V − (t, x) is a viscosity solution of (43).
Theorem 23. Assume assumptions (A1)-(A3) are in force, the lower value function V − (t, x) is a viscosity solution of (43).
Proof. We first show that the lower value function V − is a viscosity solution to (43) ; the other case is analogous. In Lemma 22, we have proved that V − satisfies, in the viscosity sense, the terminal condition, namely (51) and (51) . Therefore, we have only to address (50) . From Proposition 13, V − is continuous on [0, T ) × R n . Thus we begin by proving that V − is a viscosity supersolution. By virtue of Lemma 20, we have to show that, given
where H is defiend in (44) . Without loss of generality, postulate V − (t,x) = ϕ (t,x) . Let
We proceed as in [14] to derive the following result: For every random variable η, F smeasurable and values in V, there exists C > 0,
for all s ∈ [t, T ], P -a.s., where u 0 and v 0 denote the controls with no impulses.
Next recall
From the definition of V − (t,x) , we have
By (A1)-(A2), we have the following estimate
As a consequence, using (A3) and (55), we deduce
Therefore, applying comparison theorem (Lemma 7), we find
From the boundedness of f we deduce
Applying comparison theorem (Lemma 7) again, we have V − (t,x) ≥ Yt, where Yt is the solution to the following BSDE:
We shall take δ sufficiently small. Indeed, there existsδ > 0 such that for ζ ∈ 0,δ , we have λ − Cδ 
To abbreviate notations we set, for some arbitrarily chosen but fixed
Let us consider the following BSDE:
It is not hard to check that F s, Xt ,x s , y, z satisfies (A1) and (A2). Thus, BSDE (58) admits a unique adapted strong solution. We can characterize the solution process Y 1 s as follows.
Indeed, Gt is defined by the solution of the following BSDE:
Therefore, one just need to proveȲ s − ϕ s, Xt 
Notice that F is a deterministic function of (s, x, y, z) therefore Y 2 s , Z 2 s = (Y 0 (s) , 0) where Y 0 (s) is the solution of the ODE:
The following result indicates that the difference of the solutions of (58) and (61) s −x converges monotone to 0. On the one hand, employing Lemma 6 to BSDEs (58) and(61), we have
On the other hand, from Lemma 8, we have
with ̟ (ǫ) → 0 as ǫ → 0. Note that, for each ζ > 0, ̟ κ ζ is square integrable, we set
From the monotonicity of
From (59) and letting ε → 0,
By (64) we further have Y 0 (t) = Y 2 t ≤ Cζ̟ 0 (ζ) . Therefore, it follows easily that
and from the definition of F we see that V − is a viscosity supersolution of (43) . The proof is similar for the viscosity sub-solution. Next, we shall prove that the HJBI equation (43) has a unique viscosity solution. Consequently, the lower and upper value functions coincide, since they are both viscosity solutions to (43) . Thus, the stochastic differential game admits a value.
Before introducing the comparison theorem (not Lemma 7), we need the following two technical lemmas, mainly taken from [14] .
Lemma 24. Assume that (A3) is in force. Let U , V : [0, T ] × R n → R a viscosity supersolution and a viscosity subsolution to the HJBI equation (43), respectively. Let
supersolution and a viscosity subsolution to the HJBI equation (43), respectively. Let
then there exists ǫ > 0 for which
In order to get the uniqueness, we add the following assumption:
(A4) Assume that f is strictly monotone in y, that is, f (t, x, y 1 , z) < f (t, x, y 1 , z) , for ∀y 1 , y 2 ∈ R with So withoutloss of generality, we may assume that
Note that P 2,+V (t, x) = P 2,+Ṽ (t, x) for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R n ,Ṽ can be replaced with
Define the following text function:
Clealy, given any n ≥ 1, there exists (t n , x n , y n ) ∈ I ×B δ (x)×B δ (x) attaining the maximum of φ n on I ×B δ (x)×B δ (x). Up to a subsequence, (t n , x n , y n ) ∈ I ×B δ (x)×B δ (x) → (t 0 , x 0 , y 0 ) ∈ I ×B δ (x)×B δ (x) as n → ∞. Nonetheless, for every n ≥ 1, we have V −Ū t ′ , x ′ = φ n t ′ , x ′ , x ′ ≥ φ n (t n , x n , y n ) .
It yields that
V −Ū t ′ , x ′ ≤ sup lim n→∞ φ n (t n , x n , y n )
from which, up to a subsequence, inf lim n→∞ n |x n − y n | 2 < ∞. Then it follows that x 0 = y 0 .
From (68), we derive that
as n → ∞. By virtue of Ishii's lemma (Theorem 8.3 in [13] ), up to a subsequence, we may find sequence p 1 n , q 1 n , Q 1 n ∈ P 2,+V (t n , x n ) and p 2 n , q 2 n , Q 2 n ∈ P 2,−Ū (t n , y n ) such that p 1 n − p 2 n = 2 t n − t ′ , q 1 n = D x ψ n (t n , x n , y n ) = n (x n − y n ) , q 2 n = −D y ψ n (t n , x n , y n ) = n (x n − y n ) and 
FromŪ (t, x) (V (t, x)) is a viscosity supersolusion (subsolution) to the following HJBI equation (65), we have θŪ (t n , y n ) − p 2 n − LŪ (t n , y n ) −f t n , y n , e −θtnŪ , e −θtn DŪ · σ (t n , y n ) ≥ 0, (71) θV (t n , x n ) − p 1 n − LV (t n , x n ) −f t n , x n , e −θtnV , e −θtn DV · σ (t,
where L is defined in (66). From (71) and (72), we immediately get θV (t n , x n ) − θŪ (t n , x n ) + p 2 n − p 1 n + LŪ (t n , x n ) − LV (t n , y n ) +f t n , y n , e −θtnŪ (t n , y n ) , e −θtn q 2 n · σ (t n , y n ) −f t n , x n , e −θtnV (t n , x n ) , e −θtn q Remark 27. To get a uniqueness result for viscosity solution of (43), we adapt some techniques from [14] . We have to mention that there is another approach developed by Barles, Buckdahn and Pardoux [5] . The value function can be considered in given class of continuous functions satisfying lim |x|→∞ |u (t, x)| exp −A [log (|x|)] 2 = 0, uniformly for t ∈ [0, T ] , for some A > 0. The space of continuous functions endowed with a growth condition is slightly weaker than the assumption of polynomial growth but more restrictive than that of exponential growth. This growth condition was first introduced by Barles, Buckdahn, and Pardoux [5] to prove the uniqueness of the viscosity solution of an integro-partial differential equation associated with a decoupled FBSDEs with jumps. It has been shown in [5] that this kind of growth condition is optimal for the uniqueness and can, in general, not be weakened. These techniques have been applied in [2, 49] for the uniqueness for viscosity solutions of recursive control of the obstacle constraint problem and Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equations related to stochastic differential games, respectively. However, as you may have observed, in our HJBI equation, there appears two obstacles, which are implicit obstacles, in the sense that they depend on V − . It is worth to pointing out that the smooth supersolution built in [5] , namely χ (t, x) = exp Č (T − t) + A ψ (x) , whilst ψ (x) = log |x| 2 + 1 where C is the Lipschitz constant of f. Following the idea in [5] , whenever considering the difference of u 1 − u 2 where u 1 (u 2 ) is a subsolution (supersolution) of (43) . It is hard to check the obstacles of viscosity solution (46)- (49). This is the reason we borrow the idea from Fleming, Soner [23] and Cosso [14] to handle the uniqueness.
Remark 28. As observed in our paper, we put somewhat strong assumptions on coefficients, namely, boundedness. On the one hand, it simplifies our proof of existence. Recently, El Asri and Mazid [1] also investigate the solution to the zero-sum stochastic differential games, but under rather weak assumptions on the cost functions (c and χ are not decreasing in time). In the future, we shall adopt the idea developed by El Asri and Mazid [1] to exploit the recursive utilities.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we study on zero-sum stochastic differential games in the framework of backward stochastic differential equations on a finite time horizon with both players adopting impulse controls. By means of stochastic backward semigroups and comparison theorem of BSDE, we prove a dynamic programming principle for both the upper and the lower value functions of the game. The upper and the lower value functions are then shown to be the unique viscosity solutions of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equations with a double-obstacle. As a result, the uniqueness implies that the upper and lower value functions coincide and the game admits a value. In future, on the one hand, we will relax the condition in our paper, moreover try to find some smooth solution for HJBI (43) to get the uniqueness as claimed in Remark 27. Besides, as in Zhang [52] , we shall consider the games problems, in the viscosity sense, a stochastic differential game involving impulse controls, one player adopts impulse controls, while the other uses continuous controls on finite horizon or infinite one, etc. Certainly, all of these extensions will promote and enrich the theories of FBSDEs.
